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CASE COMMENT
TORT LAW: THE CREATION OF A CAUSE OF
ACTION FOR NEGLIGENT STILLBIRTH
Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1997)*
Shelly Kohler ***
The plaintiffs, James and Phyllis Tanner, filed a medical malpractice
action against the defendants, Doctors Hartog and Duboy and the Lakeland
Regional Medical Center, alleging that defendants' negligence caused their
child's stillbirth.' The plaintiffs brought claims for wrongful death, personal
injury, and emotional damages.2 The trial court dismissed all of their
claims.3 The appellate court affirmed the decision to dismiss the wrongful
death claim,4 explaining that the Florida Wrongful Death Act does not
recognize a fetus as a "person."' The appellate court reversed the dismissal
* Editor's Note: This case is the culmination of years of judicial discussion of its
merits. As a result, there have been a number of reported cases entitled Tanner v. Hartog.
The Florida courts have used their own short-hand labels for the different published decisions.
That pattern has been adopted in this comment to foster, hopefully, reference that are
consistent with citations that currently exist in reporters. Tanner I is the designation given to
the first case reported in 1992, and the cases are thereafter numbered consecutively, with
Tanner V being the last case reported, the instant case under discussion in this comment.
** Editor's Note: This case comment received the Huber C. Hurst Award for the
outstanding case comment for Spring 1998.
*** This case comment is dedicated to my mother, Lucille, for her guidance and support.
1. Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So. 2d 177, 178 (Fla. 1993). The plaintiffs asserted that the
doctors and hospital medical staff were negligent in failing to perform a delivery by caesarean
section at a time when the fetus was viable. Id.
2. Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 1997) [hereinafter Tanner V]. Initially,
both parents of the stillborn child brought suit for wrongful death of the fetus and personal
injury of the mother. Id. Later, the father filed an amended complaint and added the count
of negligent stillbirth. Id.
3. Tanner v. Hartog, 678 So. 2d 1317, 1318 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming the
dismissal of the negligent stillbirth claim, but certifying a question to the Florida Supreme
Court that was decided in the instant case) [hereinafter Tanner V]; Tanner v. Hartog, 630 So.
2d 1136, 1136 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming the dismissal of the wrongful death
and personal injury claims) [hereinafter Tanner III).
4. Tanner II1, 630 So. 2d at 1136-37 (citing Stem v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977)).
5. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.16-.27 (1998). Florida's Wrongful Death Act provides:
When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, default, or
breach of contract or warranty of any person, including those occurring on navigable
waters, and the event would have entitled the person injured to maintain an action

228

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA W AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 10

of the personal injury claim, holding that a fetus is the living tissue of the
mother's body for which she can have a wrongful injury claim as she would
for any other part of her body.6 Lastly, the appellate court affirmed the
dismissal of the negligent stillbirth claim, explaining that a parent cannot
recover emotional damages without sustaining a physical impact.7 The
appellate court certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether
a cause of action for emotional damages resulting from a negligent stillbirth
exists under Florida law.8 The Florida Supreme Court 9 answered in the
affirmative and HELD, that Florida should recognize a parental action for
damages for mental pain and anguish resulting from negligent stillbirth. 1°
All jurisdictions within the United States permit recovery for prenatal
injuries when the child survives. I' Further, all jurisdictions permit recovery
for wrongful death if the child dies after birth from prenatal injuries."
Historically, however, courts have struggled to justify recovery for prenatal
injuries to the fetus when a child is stillborn. 3 Some states have allowed
14
parents to recover under a wrongful death theory when a child is stillborn,

and recover damages if death had not ensued, the person or watercraft that would
have been liable in damages if death had not ensued shall be liable for damages as
specified in this act notwithstanding the death of the person injured, although death
was caused under circumstances constituting a felony.
Id. § 768.19.
6. Tanner 111, 630 So. 2d at 1136 (citing Singleton v. Ranz, 534 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1988)).
7. Tanner IV, 678 So. 2d at 1318. Florida is an impact rule state. See R.J. v. Humana
of Florida, Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1995). For a plaintiff to recover damages for
emotional distress caused by the defendant's negligence, the impact rule requires the emotional
injury be the result of a physical harm. See Reynolds v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 611
So. 2d 1294, 1296 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
8. Tanner IV, 678 So. 2d at 1318.
9. The court had jurisdiction under FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
10. Tanner V, 696 So. 2d at 708.
11. "The child, if he is born alive, is now permitted in every jurisdiction to maintain an
action for the consequences of prenatal injuries, and if he dies of such injuries after birth an
action will lie for his wrongful death." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 368 (5th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
12. Id.
13. Tanner V, 696 So. 2d at 707 ("Claims for negligently caused stillbirth have vexed the
courts of our nation for many years."); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 55, at 369
(explaining jurisdictional disagreement for recovery in cases where the mother's body is
harmed and the child is stillborn).
14. See T.A. Borowski, Jr., Comment, No Liability for the Wrongful Death of Unborn
Children - The Florida Legislature Refuses to Protect the Unborn, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv.
835, 846 (1988). A majority of states and the District of Columbia recognize a cause of
action for wrongful death of a fetus: Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, District of
Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at 846 n.76.
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however, the Florida Supreme Court denied recovery under this theory in
Stern v. Miller.5
In Stem, the defendant allegedly caused a car accident that involved the

pregnant plaintiff.1 6

The plaintiff's child was subsequently stillborn. 7

The plaintiff argued that the child would have survived but for the accident
and sued the defendant for wrongful death.18 The trial court dismissed the
complaint, holding that a fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the

Florida Wrongful Death Act.' 9 The appellate court reversed, holding that
a viable fetus2" is a person for purposes of the Act, and certified its decision
to the Florida Supreme Court.2 '
The Florida Supreme Court quashed the appellate court's opinion,
holding that a viable fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the
Act.22 The Stern court opined that the legislative intent of the Act was not
to entitle parents of stillborn children to bring actions for wrongful death. 3
Reversing the appellate court decision, the Stern court held that a wrongful
death action can only arise after the live birth and subsequent death of a child.24

For stillbirth purposes, most states interpret "person" as including an unborn child. Id. at 846.
15. 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977).
16. Id. at 304.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (relying on FLA. STAT. § 768.19, which provides: "When the death of a person
is caused by the wrongful act ... of any person ... and the event would have entitled the
person injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued, the person
").
...shall be liable ..
20. A viable fetus is one capable of independent life, capable of living outside the uterus,
even if this means survival in an incubator. KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 55, at 368.
21. Stem, 348 So. 2d at 304.
22. Id. at 308. The court acknowledged that there existed compelling reasons for recovery
for the death of a viable fetus.
A viable fetus is a human being, capable of independent existence outside the
womb; a human life is therefore destroyed when a viable fetus is killed; it is wholly
irrational to allow liability to depend on whether death from fatal injuries occurs just
before or just after birth; it is absurd to allow recovery for prenatal injuries unless
they are so severe as to cause death; such a situation favors the wrongdoer who
causes death over the one who merely causes injuries, and so enables the tortfeasor
to foreclose his own liability.
Id. at 306 (citing W.L. Heyman, Action for Death of Unborn Child, 15 A.L.R.3d 992 (1967)).
23. Id. at 307. The Court noted that in Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., it had
held that the then current wrongful death statute, § 768.03, did not include a stillborn fetus.
Id. (citing Stokes, 213 So. 2d 695, 700 (Fla. 1968)). Because Stokes had been decided before
the state legislature amended the statute in 1972, the legislature had the opportunity at that
time to reword the statute in defining the term "person." Id. However, it chose not to, and
the Stern court held that this was indicative of the legislative intent not to include the fetus
in this definition. Id.; see also Davis v. Simpson, 313 So. 2d 796, 798 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (holding that an unborn fetus is not a "person" for purposes of the wrongful death
statute).
24. Stern, 348 So. 2d at 307.
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While a minority of jurisdictions agree with the Florida decision not to
recognize a wrongful death action for a stillborn child,25 most permit the
mother to recover for personal injury.26 Since the Fifth District Court
decision in Singleton v. Ranz,27 Florida courts also have permitted mothers
of stillborn children to bring personal injury claims against negligent
defendants.2 8 In Singleton, the plaintiff alleged that she had suffered bodily
injury as a result of her child's stillbirth, which was caused by the defendant's negligence. 29 The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment, holding that the law recognizes no recovery for her
damages.3 °
The appellate court reversed, finding material issues of fact in dispute. 1
The Singleton court explained that a fetus is the living tissue of a mother's
body. 32 A mother can have a legal cause of action for wrongful injury to
that part of her body as she similarly could for injury to any other part of her
body. 33 Finding it necessary for the trial court to determine whether the
defendant caused any bodily injury to the mother, the Singleton court
remanded for trial.34
The Singleton court did not address whether a mother can recover
damages for emotional injuries suffered as a result of a stillbirth. 35 A few
jurisdictions permit emotional distress recovery for the negligent stillbirth of
a child.36

However, unlike these states, Florida is an impact rule state.37

For a plaintiff to recover damages for emotional distress, the impact rule
requires the emotional injury suffered to result from some physical injury that
the plaintiff sustained due to another's negligence.38 However, the Florida

25. Borowski, supra note 14, at 846. States that are in conformity with Florida's decision
not to allow a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus generally hold that an unborn
child is not a "person": California, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey,
New York, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Id. at 846 & n.79.
26. Coughlin v. George Washington Univ. Health Plan, Inc., 565 A.2d 67 (D.C. 1989);
Prado v. Catholic Med. Ctr., Inc., 536 N.Y.S.2d 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
27. 534 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
28. McGeehan v. Parke-Davis, 573 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
29. Singleton, 534 So. 2d at 848.
30. Id.
31. Id.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.

35. Id. (Dauksch, J., concurring).
36. Abdallah v. Callender, 1 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 1993); Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d
1197 (Cal. 1992); Giardina v. Bennett, 545 A.2d 139 (N.J. 1988); Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics
& Gynecology Assocs., 395 S.E.2d 85 (N.C. 1990); Modaber v. Kelley, 348 S.E.2d 233 (Va.
1986).
37. See R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1995).
38. Reynolds v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 611 So. 2d 1294, 1296 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992); see also R.J., 652 So. 2d at 362.
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Supreme Court has created a few specific exceptions to the impact rule that
permit recovery for emotional distress without any attendant physical
injury.39 One of these exceptions was for a wrongful birth action in Kush
v. Lloyd.n°

In Kush, the plaintiff, after giving birth to a deformed child, sought
genetic counseling from the defendant.4n After genetic testing, the defendant informed the plaintiff that the deformity was not a result of a genetic
defect, and the birth of another child would be without incident. 42 Subsequently, the plaintiff gave birth to a second child, who was similarly
deformed, 3 Additional genetic tests disclosed the existence of a hereditary
genetic defect. 44 The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for
wrongful birth.45 The trial court dismissed the claim.' The appellate court
reversed, holding that the plaintiff had stated a valid claim for emotional
distress caused by the birth, even without a physical impact.4 7
The Florida Supreme Court approved the claim for wrongful birth. 8
The Kush court explained that the impact rule is inapplicable to tort actions
for which damages are predominantly emotional. 49 Emotional injury is
certain when negligent medical advice causes parents to give birth to severely

39. Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Brown,
66 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1953) (explaining that damages for mental suffering may be recoverable
for negligent defamation); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1944) (holding emotional
distress damages recoverable for invasion of privacy).
40. 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 417.
42. Id. The defendant initially failed to perform a fluorescent banding study before
informing the plaintiff there were no genetic abnormalities. Id. When the test was finally
conducted, the results were not transmitted to the plaintiff. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Both children had 10p trisomy, a genetic abnormality, inherited from the mother.
Id.
45. Id. Wrongful birth is a medical malpractice action by parents for the birth of an
impaired or deformed child. Id. n.2. The parents may contend that "negligent treatment or
advice deprived them of the opportunity or knowledge to avoid conception or to terminate the
pregnancy." Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DIcrIONARY 1612 (6th ed. 1990)). The parental
objective is "to recover damages for the extraordinary expense of caring for the impaired or
deformed child, over and above routine rearing expenses." Id. (citing Fassoulas v. Ramey,
450 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. 1984)).
46. Id. at 417.
47. Id. at 418. The Third District Court of Appeal held that emotional distress was a
natural consequence of a wrongful birth, and thus, damages were recoverable regardless of
physical impact. Id.; see also Speck v. Finegold, 439 A.2d 110, 114 (Pa. 1981); Naccash v.
Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825 (Va. 1982).
48. Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 423 (Fla. 1992) (per curiam).
49. Id. at 422. "[T]he impact doctrine should not be applied where emotional damages
are an additional 'parasitic' consequence of conduct that itself is a freestanding tort apart from
any emotional injury." Id. (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, at 361-65).
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deformed children.5" Thus, the Kush court held that public policy requires
courts not to apply the impact rule to wrongful birth claims.5'
As it did in the Kush opinion, the Florida Supreme Court in the instant
case created an exception to the impact rule.52 It held that parents of a
negligently stillborn child may recover for emotional damages regardless of
the existence of an attendant physical impact.53 In the instant court's
opinion, it
has created a new cause of action in Florida for "negligent
54
stillbirth.
In the instant case, the court reaffirmed its decision in Stern that the
parents of a stillborn child cannot recover under the wrongful death
statute,55 and that a fetus is not a person.56 The court held that by
permitting the mother of a stillborn child to recover for physical injuries, the
Singleton court and courts following its opinion, cleverly circumvented the
impact rule.57

The court disfavored this roundabout approach to justify

parental recovery.5 8
The instant court explained that the primary obstacle to creating a cause
of action, in which parents of a child who is stillborn due to another's
negligence can recover for emotional damages, is the impact rule.59
However, the court asserted that an outright denial of damages to compensate
for the mental pain and anguish experienced by these parents could not be
justified.60 Thus, it held that a natural evolution of law requires the Florida
courts to recognize an action for "negligent stillbirth."' 6' The instant court
held that an action for negligent stillbirth is a suit available to parents to
recover for the death of their fetus due to another's negligence.6 2 Under
this action, damages would be limited to compensation for the mental pain
and anguish the parents are certain to experience as a result of the stillbirth.63 As long as the parents of a stillborn child can prove that the
defendant caused the death of the fetus, the parents can recover, not for
wrongful death, but for the emotional distress suffered. 64

50. Id.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 423.
Tanner V, 696 So. 2d at 708.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 706.
Id.
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 708.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 709.
Id. at 708.
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By overruling previous Florida court decisions,65 the instant court has
created a parental cause of action for negligently caused stillbirth.66 In
doing so, the instant court has created an exception to Florida's impact
rule.67 The justification for Florida's reliance on the impact rule is the
prevention of fictitious claims of emotional distress. 68 By requiring that the
plaintiff suffer a physical impact, the impact rule creates a guarantee of
genuine, perceivable injury. 69 The rule also provides defendants with
certainty as to who the potential plaintiffs are.7 ° By creating a cause of
action for negligent stillbirth, the instant court did not undermine the public
policy justifications that underlie the impact rule.7'
Parents of stillborn children undoubtedly suffer the real and severe
injuries of emotional distress and mental anguish,72 just as the parents in
Kush did at the birth of their deformed child.73 Because the loss that
parents feel at the death of their child is both predictable74 and genuine,7 5
the instant court's ruling has not opened the floodgates to fictitious claims by
permitting parents to bring a cause of action for negligent stillbirth.76
Furthermore, defendants will not be deprived of the certainty of their

65. See Henderson v. North, 545 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (dismissing
the mother's claim of mental anguish due to the negligent stillbirth of her child); Abdelaziz
v. A.M.I.S.U.B. of Fla., Inc., 515 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting the
mother's claim of personal injury because she had suffered no physical injury in addition to
the stillbirth).
66. Tanner V, 696 So. 2d at 709 (stating that the court "disapprove[s] [of] Abdelaziz as
well as Henderson ... to the extent that they disapprove [of] a cause of action for negligent
stillbirth") (citations omitted)).
67. Id.
68. R.J. v. Humana of Fla., Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 362 (Fla. 1995) ("[T]he underlying basis
for the rule is that allowing recovery for injuries resulting from purely emotional distress
would open the floodgates for fictitious or speculative claims.") (citing 1 THOMAS M.
COOLEY, COOLEY ON TORTS 97 (3d ed. 1906)); see also Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17,
18 (Fla. 1985) (explaining the use of the impact rule is an attempt to alleviate problems of
proof, fraudulent claims, and excessive litigation).
69. R.J., 652 So. 2d at 362 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 54, at 363).
70. Id. at 362-63 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 11, § 54, at 364) ("[W]ithout an
impact requirement, defendants would not be sure whom they had injured or where they may
have injured a person, thus paralyzing their ability to defend themselves.").
71. Tanner V, 696 So. 2d at 708.
72. Giardina v. Bennett, 545 A.2d 139, 141 (N.J. 1988) (explaining that the death of the
healthy baby creates "emotional distress and mental anguish").
73. Tanner IV, 678 So. 2d at 1322.
74. Tanner V, 696 So. 2d at 707 (citing Giardina,545 A.2d at 140).
75. Tanner IV, 678 So. 2d at 1322 (holding that a stillbirth results in genuine, "irreparable
trauma").
76. Id. (stating that "a stillbirth naturally results in emotional trauma to the parents; thus,
the impact rule's purpose of preventing fraudulent claims should be satisfied"); see also Carey
v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279, 1287 (N.J. 1994) ("The maternal-fetal relationship bespeaks the
genuineness of an otherwise-valid claim for emotional distress.").
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potential plaintiffs.77 A parent of a stillborn child is a foreseeable victim. 78
The instant court explained that the parents of a stillborn child will most
likely experience mental pain and anguish. 79 Any defendant can foresee
that if his negligence causes a baby to be stillborn, the parents of the child
will suffer emotionally. 80 Moreover, the instant court extended recovery to
the father of the stillborn child. 8' Because the tragedy of the loss of a child
has emotional ties with the
affects the family unit, and the father 8also
3
fetus, 82 the father is a foreseeable victim.
The instant court's decision to create a cause of action for negligent
stillbirth is unprecedented. 84 The parents of a stillborn child will no longer
need to claim infliction of physical injury to the mother in order to establish
a cause of action. 85 Finally, both the mother and father of a child who is
born dead due to another's negligence will recover for their emotional

77. Giardina, 545 A.2d at 141 (holding that the defendant's negligence in causing the
stillbirth predictably caused emotional distress to the parents).
78. The Florida Supreme Court has acknowledged three factors in determining whether
a defendant " 'should reasonably foresee the injury'" to a plaintiff: (1) whether the plaintiff
was located in close proximity to the accident, (2) whether the plaintiff suffered shock as a
result of a " 'direct emotional impact' " from observance of the accident, and (3) the
relationship between the plaintiff and the victim. Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 19 (Fla.
1985) (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920-21 (Cal. 1968)).
79. Tanner V, 696 So. 2d at 708 ("[I]t is difficult to justify the outright denial of a claim
for the mental pain and anguish which is so likely to be experienced by parents as a result of
the birth of a stillborn child caused by the negligence of another."); see also Carey, 622 A.2d
at 1286 ("[P]arents will likely suffer anytime anyone injures their child.").
80. Carey, 622 A.2d at 1286. "Any time a doctor negligently injures a child it is
foreseeable that the parents will suffer emotional distress." Id. The court went on to conclude
that "the physical and emotional ties between mother and fetus so unite them that a physician
should anticipate that any malpractice that adversely affects the fetus will cause emotional
distress to the mother." Id.; see also Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., 395
S.E.2d 85 (N.C. 1990).
81. Tanner V, 696 So. 2d at 709; see also Abdallah v. Callender, 1 F.3d 141, 148 (3d Cir.
1993) (holding that a father can have his own claim); Giardina,545 A.2d at 143 (holding that
the father also has a claim for emotional distress and mental anguish).
82. See Carey, 622 A.2d at 1287 (stating that "the fairness of extending the doctor's duty
of reasonable care to the father is strengthened by the family ties between the victim and the
father"); see also Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J. 1984) (recognizing that the
defendant's tort committed against the mother and unborn child was a tort committed against
the entire immediate family unit); Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 839 (N.J. 1981) ("A
family is woven of the fibers of life; if one strand is damaged, the whole structure may suffer.
The filaments of family life, although individually spun, create a web of interconnected legal
interests.").
83. See Tanner IV, 678 So. 2d at 1321 ("If a mother is permitted to make such a claim,
then logic and reason tell us that a father who has sustained identical damages from the same
negligent act should not be precluded from recovery by the impact rule."); see also Giardina,
545 A.2d at 142 (concluding that the doctor's wrongful conduct in causing the stillbirth
constitutes a tort against both parents).
84. Tanner V, 696 So. 2d at 708.
85. Id. at 707.
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suffering.86 The immediate outcome of the instant court's decision is the
expansion of liability to the medical profession.87 However, because the
emotional suffering of parents of a stillborn child is foreseeable, this
increased liability is justifiable.88

86. Id. at 708.
87. Tanner IV, 678 So. 2d at 1322 (explaining that allowing a negligent stillbirth cause
of action would have substantial impact on the cost of providing medical care to the public);
see also Carey, 622 A.2d at 1286.
88. See Tanner IV, 678 So. 2d at 1322; Carey, 622 A.2d at 1286.

